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Fashion as an Aesthetic Form of Life: 
A Wittgensteinian Interpretation
ELENA ABATE
Fashion is an aesthetic practice which concerns the ordinary sphere of 
our life: it is associated with everydayness and it is a source of endless 
aesthetic experiences. The purpose of this paper is to validate a new per-
spective on fashion based on Wittgenstein’s later aesthetic conception. 
In Philosophical Perspectives on Fashion (2017), Matteucci introduces 
the idea of combining the Wittgensteinian concept of “form of life” with 
fashion. In accordance with this thesis, the paper aims at showing how 
fashion is constituted as a “form of life”. Specifi cally, I shall argue that 
fashion is an “aesthetics form of life” which structurally employs a lan-
guage of an aesthetic type ––one with a specifi c grammar (or set of rules) 
of its own. I claim that there is in fashion a contact point between the 
grammar of language and socially encoded aesthetic responses: fash-
ion follows slavishly its own grammar, through its cyclical seasonality, 
while at the same time tending to creatively reinvent itself. Thus, anyone 
who daily commits to the practices of fashion acquires sensitivity to its 
rules, contributing to a social dialectic of identifi cation/diversifi cation 
typically belonging to fashion itself. Finally, on the basis of the claim 
that fashion is a “form of life”, and indeed since fashion is primarily 
an aesthetic practice, I claim that Wittgenstein’s aesthetic notions can 
coherently be related to fashion as well: concepts such as ‘aesthetic reac-
tion’, ‘gesture’, and ‘correctness’ will be shown to be crucial to an analysis 
of the aesthetic phenomenon of fashion.
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1. Introduction
Within the discipline of aesthetics, the appearance of fashion as a fi eld 
of enquiry in relatively recent. The abundancy of studies related to 
fashion in literature, sociology, psychology, economy and anthropol-
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ogy is not nearly matched by the relatively exiguous number of studies 
devoted to the topic in philosophical aesthetics1. Nevertheless, as Ian 
King states, fashion can afford us a new opportunity to understand 
contemporary aesthetics, provided that our understanding of it will 
be detached from “the discussion in the aesthetics literature [that has 
been] normally theoretical, normative and reliant predominantly on 
understandings taken from fi ne art” (King 2017: 2). A different un-
derstanding or approach to fashion should take into consideration its 
practical and ordinary dimension, focusing on the daily activities and 
everyday objects that fashion itself involves. Before trying to spell out 
what I take to be the fi rst essential step toward a different understand-
ing of fashion, I wish however to defi ne what I mean by “fashion.”
The term “fashion” is often associated with an institutionalized sys-
tem made up by groups, organizations, producers, events and practices, 
other than being simply associated with dress or clothing (cf. Kawamura 
2005: 43). However, it seems rather arbitrary to exclude a priori from a 
defi nition of “fashion” some of the aspects of the complex and multifari-
ous phenomenon we call “fashion”, or at any rate to marginalize them. 
At the same time, in the condensed space of a paper, it is impossible to 
deal with most of them. Without claiming to be exhaustive, I shall thus 
restrict the fi eld of application of my defi nition of “fashion” to two aspect 
aspects of the phenomenon of fashion, which are meant to support my 
arguments in what follows. First, I take “fashion” to signify an everyday 
practice with which we confront daily. Specifi cally, I mean the ensemble 
of actions involved in the practice of dressing ourselves up.2 Secondly, I 
take “fashion” to signify an ensemble of objects and activities permeated 
by a deep aesthetic dimension (which I intend to articulate in the pres-
ent paper), insofar as fashion involves embodied collective experiences 
through which is possible to create—and move into—a meaningful aes-
thetic space. Given my defi nition, I thus take fashion to be both tangible 
and intangible, because it implies experiential practices—such as dress-
ing ourselves, buying and wearing items, etc.—while at the same time 
concerning an immaterial or non-strictly-material domain, made up of 
aesthetic proprieties, relations, reactions, expressions, and values.
2. Fashion as ordinary aesthetic practice
2.1 Fashion within aesthetics
The interrelation between fashion and aesthetics can be traced back to 
the 19th and 20th centuries, when philosophers and literati3 displayed 
1 While the sociological, psychological, economic, moral, political, anthropological 
and more other approaches to fashion are of great importance, in this paper, for 
reasons of space, I will concentrate on the aesthetic dimension of fashion alone.
2 This sense of fashion might be considered closer to the concept of ‘clothing’ or 
‘dress’, which are connected to fashion in a wide sense in turn.
3 Cf. Matteucci 2019. Matteucci quotes philosophers (such as Simmel, Spencer, 
Benjamin and Fink) and men of literature (namely Balzac, Baudelaire, d’Annunzio, 
Carlyle).
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an interest in the aesthetic implications of fashion for the fi rst time. 
Yet, nowadays the aesthetic dimension of fashion seems to be obvious; 
so obvious, I believe, that it often escapes consideration. In this section, 
my aim is to describe the fi rst theoretical steps that have been taken 
toward a rediscovery of how fashion relates to reality creating deeply 
aestheticized fi elds that permeate our ordinary life.
To give a clear account of why fashion has to be considered an aes-
thetic phenomenon, I shall fi rst of all mention Iannilli’s (2017) reasons 
concerning why fashion should be considered as one of Everyday Aes-
thetics’ key topics. The fi rst reason—described as “empirical”—con-
cerns the production of the fashion items which affect our everyday life: 
fashion provides an ensemble of objects—e.g. clothing items and acces-
sories—to which we refer through descriptions that pick out aesthetic 
qualities and properties4. The second reason is described as “theoreti-
cal”: fashion shapes our ordinary experience and “emphasizes specifi c 
structures of the latter that cannot be neglected from a purely aesthetic 
point of view, since they indeed result in a very particular confi guration 
of the aesthetic in everyday life” (Iannilli 2017: 231). Further, fashion 
contributes to the processes of aestheticization by creating immersive 
experiences of continuous consumption. Indeed, it is undeniable that 
fashion presents an aesthetic dimension, especially within our ‘post-in-
dustrial’ society, in which aesthetics “can no longer be confi ned within 
an ideal and isolated sphere such as the system of fi ne arts governed by 
the industrial society” (Matteucci 2016: 10).
 Notwithstanding all of this, for long time, everyday practices and 
objects—such as fashion—have been considered too ephemeral or su-
perfi cial to have an impact on aesthetic refl ection. Only comparatively 
recently philosophers have turned their attention to our deeply aes-
theticized ordinary contexts (to which are dressing practices obviously 
belong). In fact, as Dewey5 claimed, the aim “is to restore continuity 
between the refi ned and intensifi ed forms of experience that are works 
of art and the everyday events, doings, and sufferings that are univer-
sally recognized to constitute experience” (Dewey 1934: 3). Everyday 
aesthetics (EA) aim to respond to an increasingly severe restriction of 
the aesthetic domain over time, which started with Kant’s aesthetic ac-
count; focusing the aesthetic inquiry almost entirely on the defi nition 
of beauty and the sublime, as Kant did, caused in fact a signifi cant art-
centred shift in the discourse of aesthetics qua discipline.
4 For example, one can defi ne a certain dress as ‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’ or ‘cute’, etc.
5 According to Yuriko Saito’s entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Dewey is considered the forerunner of Everyday Aesthetics: focusing of the aesthetic 
experience of an artwork (Art as Experience, 1934), he encouraged to concentrate 
on ordinary experience, rather that artistic products, insofar the starting point of 
aesthetics is the aesthetic “in the raw” (Saito 2019).
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Clearly, however, our everyday life deserves aesthetic scrutiny as 
well. And so, as Ratiu clarifi es, “the scope of aesthetics [is today] ex-
panded to include areas of everyday life previously neglected” (Ratiu 
2013: 7). Specifi cally, daily objects and quotidian activities, such as 
dressing up, can now claim to belong legitimately to the scope of aes-
thetics, insofar as they “they contribute constantly and crucially, in 
everyday life, to the confi guration of the taste of individuals and to the 
understanding of the environments that surround us and with which 
we interact.” (Matteucci 2017: 111–112). Indeed, “the recognition of 
fashion’s dignity as a philosophical and specifi cally aesthetic research 
topic seems to imply the necessity for a broadening of the domain of 
aesthetics itself, for it traditionally follows an art-centred and/or na-
ture-centred paradigm of investigation” (Iannilli 2017: 230).
Already considering the short summary above, I think it is fair to 
say that the question about the correlation between fashion and the 
realm of aesthetic is often misinterpreted. Instead of asking “why does 
fashion have an aesthetic dimension?”, it is more appropriate to ques-
tion why the discipline of aesthetics did not consider fashion as an im-
portant topic to discuss in the fi rst place. This sort of considerations 
makes clear that a reconsideration of fashion within an aesthetic 
framework is urgently required.
2.2 A new aesthetic interpretation of fashion
Concerning the aesthetic dimension of fashion, it is crucial fi rst of all 
to defi ne in which way fashion intertwines with the ordinary element. 
In order to give such description of fashion, I wish to introduce Mat-
teucci’s notion of hypo-aesthetic level6, which he uses to illustrate the 
“presence of aesthetic elements in everyday life” (Matteucci 2016: 14).
The hypo-aesthetic level concerns the diffusion of aesthetic ele-
ments within everyday life––those elements, that is, that constantly 
shape our interaction with reality in an aesthetic way, working un-
derneath the surface. As a matter of fact, human beings have always 
shaped their reality through aesthetic devices, for example words and 
images used in a non-denotative sense. The deep historical and psycho-
logical root of such aesthetic phenomena could also instruct us about 
the recent structural changes in our ways of experiencing reality, in 
which fashion plays a non-marginal role. This genetic analysis, in turn, 
would pave the way for the thesis that fashion constitutes—at least 
nowadays—a peculiar “form of life”, the elements of which were al-
ready dormant in previous (non-thoroughly-aestheticized) forms of life.
From the perspective of the hypo-aesthetic level, fashion is to be 
6 See Matteucci 2016. In contrast to the hypo-aesthetic level, Matteucci also 
introduces the notion of ‘hyper-aesthetic level’, which refers to those aesthetic 
elements in everyday life that can trigger experiences with an abundance of 
aesthetic content. Although relevant connections could be made between this level 
and fashion, I will not have enough space in this paper to investigate this correlation.
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understood as a deep routine that “remains with people over time” 
(Buckley and Clark 2012: 19). In our daily life, we use and remodel 
fashionable clothes, again and again. Nevertheless, we usually refer to 
fashion in terms of regular stylistic innovation supported by an institu-
tionalized system of production. Through this standard notion of fash-
ion (qua innovation, perpetual change, etc.), we perceive the system of 
fashion as extraordinary, extravagant, uncommon: “in fact according 
with Buckley and Clark (2012: 20) while the extraordinariness of high 
fashion has been clearly visible, ordinary fashion has been resolutely 
invisible.” However, fashion can be both: ordinary, in its everyday di-
mension, and extraordinary, as fashion itself sets the seasonality and 
the novelty. People constantly dress themselves and, in this way, de-
pict their interpretation of the cycles of fashion. We experience fashion 
every day without noticing that we are experiencing it: in fact, as a 
proof of this inner behaviour, we dress ourselves up every day.
“The problem, as Sheringham points out (2006: 22) [is that] the 
everyday is beneath our attention. It is what we overlook.” Dressing 
ourselves is such a simple task that in every moment of our daily rou-
tine it might be perceived to be obvious, precisely because the ordinary 
escapes notice.7 In fashion the perception of everydayness is hard to 
locate because fashion is mostly identifi ed with modernity, fastness, 
fl eetingness. However, if we pay attention to both aspects of fashion 
outlined above, we can easily see that fashion is indeed able to create a 
conjunction between modernity (intended as velocity and variableness) 
and everydayness. Thus, fashion offers the possibility to set practices 
regarding our everyday life, combining creativity and repetitiveness: 
it provides the possibility of reinventing one’s own image repeatedly 
within everyday life.
Considering what we have said so far, fashion appears as an ordi-
nary aesthetic practice that concerns also a particular kind of objects 
that can acquire aesthetic properties in everyday contexts. Neverthe-
less, fashion is still a controversial topic within the domain of the Ev-
eryday Aesthetics, and indeed as a general aesthetic phenomenon. The 
problem is that fashion is and has been treated poorly with respect to 
other human phenomena we study, as it is considered lacking in a solid 
theoretical basis. The theoretical unreliability that is historically as-
sociated with fashion is due to the fact that, at fi rst glance, it presents 
itself as “a bundle of problems that join together in an irregular man-
ner” (Matteucci, 2017: 13).
There are, however, encouraging signals of change with respect to 
this problem. Despite the lack of systematic philosophical enquiries 
concerning fashion, Matteucci has recently provided a critical exami-
nation of fashion (cf. Matteucci and Marino 2017) comparing four dif-
7 As Wittgenstein writes: “The aspects of things that are most important for 
us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice 
something—because it is always before one’s eyes.) […] And this means: we fail to be 
struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful” (PI, § 129).
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ferent aesthetic paradigms to fashion, in order to understand which 
one can describe fashion in the most accurate manner. Here, I wish 
to show that one of these paradigms, namely the one that reads the 
phenomenon of fashion in the light of Wittgenstein’s concept of “form 
of life”, can be the most fruitful one, if our aim is that of giving an aes-
thetic characterization of fashion. Thus, the purpose of my arguments 
below will be to demonstrate that the concept of “form of life” applied 
to fashion might constitute a viable paradigm for fashion, if infl ected 
in an aesthetic manner, in terms of what I shall call “aesthetic form of 
life.” Specifi cally, I will argue below that this paradigm suits fashion 
as an everyday practice, intended as the repetitive act of dressing our-
selves up in daily life, in certain manners, which depend on the specifi c 
occasions.8
3. Form of life and rules
Matteucci’s comparison uses the analytical aesthetic theory by Woll-
heim in Art and its Objects (1968): outlining what is to be understood 
as art and as an aesthetic, Wollheim compares art to a “form of life” 
using this concept in the meaning with which Wittgenstein himself ex-
plained his conception of language and language games. By “form of 
life” we mean therefore the set of habits, intrinsic experiences, indeed 
a language and its uses. Equally, to describe the aesthetic fi eld as a 
“form of life” implies considering perceptive and cultural experiential 
practices in which the subjects involved express themselves by draw-
ing a horizon of shared taste. However, expressing one’s own horizon 
of taste does not mean establishing a static set of signs or indexes to 
represent things, that is, following a semiotic modus operandi. On the 
contrary, drawing a horizon of taste is to bring out the physiognomy of 
things in common ways, one expressing familiarity. A system of famil-
iar aesthetic relations, in this sense, is manifested through the various 
forms of taste, such as art and even fashion.
I argue that the best way to describe fashion’s mechanism is com-
paring it to the late Wittgenstenian concept of language, and in partic-
ular with the “form of life” concept. By ‘form of life’ we mean therefore 
the set of habits, intrinsic experiences, indeed a language and its uses. 
Wittgenstein describes this concept as an Übereinstimmung (agree-
ment, concordance) in the sense of producing consensus and regularity. 
The intersubjective agreement within a form of life is situated in lan-
guage interpreted as a universal medium and as a place of consensus 
and possible constitution of experience in the world (Borutti 1993: 1). 
Language as a form of life is a condition of a possible community.
The concept of “form of life” is tied to the concept of language, as 
Wittgenstein points out in Philosophical Investigations in § 19: “to 
8 These occasions include, for example, going to work, to an interview, to a 
wedding, to a theme party, to a dinner or a business lunch, to the park, and so on.
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imagine a language means to imagine a form of life” and “speaking 
a language is part of an activity, or a form of life” (PI, § 23). In the 
perspective of Philosophical Investigations, language is made of sev-
eral language games at the same time. Language games are defi ned by 
Wittgenstein as “objects of comparison which are meant to throw light 
on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of 
dissimilarities (PI, § 130)” and are used by Wittgenstein with the in-
tention of shedding clarity onto language. Language games are models 
that expand our way of looking at language and allow us to observe its 
multiplicity. The rules of a game are not strict: “the rule may be an aid 
in teaching the game (PI, § 54)”: you can learn a rule either by observ-
ing a game or by playing it. In the latter case, a player can understand 
the rules of a game directly through practice.
In the case of language, this means that one can understand the 
meaning of different words in a language game and the specifi c rules 
governing their use, as the game allows access to a fi eld of application 
of the words themselves (the use of the words in language). In fact, 
Wittgenstein affi rms also that “without these rules, the word has no 
meaning, and if the rules change also the meaning changes” (PI, § 552). 
By following the rule, one can understand, at the same time, what the 
rule is and how to apply it.
Furthermore, “also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one 
is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey 
a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be 
the same thing as obeying it” (PI, § 202). In fact, to follow a rule is a 
public practice as it implies the recognition of the rule by people who 
follow the same rule. It is impossible to follow a rule privately because 
following a rule is itself a practice, which requires approvals, disap-
provals, gestures, orders that strengthen the rule, and so on. According 
to Wittgenstein, these are “grammatical annotations” on the expres-
sion of following a rule that concerns habits upon which humans agree.
4. Wittgenstein’s perspective on aesthetics
Within an aesthetic perspective, Wittgenstein dealt with aesthetics 
by dealing with problems concerning the meaning of aesthetic words. 
Before Wittgenstein, the concept of beauty was the starting point of 
aesthetic refl ection. However, Wittgenstein noticed that all sorts of 
confusions and misunderstandings arise from the analysis of the form 
of traditional aesthetic utterances, i.e. the Kantian type of proposition 
“this X is beautiful” (Johannessen 1996: 24–25). In fact, we are misled 
into thinking that it is possible to infer structural features of the world 
thanks to the structural features of the proposition: “according to Jo-
hannessen (1996: 25) we are in fact tempted to reason from language 
to reality.” This temptation leads us to ignore all the other kinds of aes-
thetic judgments that, according to Wittgenstein, concern aesthetic fea-
tures far more important than beauty, and that which we call beautiful.
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Indeed, Wittgenstein breaches into the tradition of aesthetic en-
quiry claiming that it is not necessary to fi nd a correct and universal 
defi nition of beauty, because, as with the concept of art, the borders 
and the application of the concept of beauty are essentially vague.
Furthermore, whenever Wittgenstein refers to aesthetic concepts, 
he accepts their radical indeterminacy: he claims that it is not worthful 
to ask for the precise defi nition and boundaries for aesthetics concepts 
because their very nature is vague.
In Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Re-
ligious Belief (LC, 1966) he mentions his disinterest in ‘Aesthetic as a 
science’, i.e. the science of the beautiful. Thereby, “Wittgenstein (LC, 
2:1) starts by investigating what could be meant by ‘Aesthetics’”, claim-
ing that the aesthetic fi eld “is very big and entirely misunderstood” (LC 
1:1). In fact, he points out that it is useless to focus only on terms like 
“beautiful” or “ugly” because in aesthetics there are a great amount of 
interjections and reactions to artworks or natural beauty.
Primarily, Wittgenstein concentrated on the use of aesthetic expres-
sions and their linguistic form. He wanted to explore how and where 
aesthetic judgments are employed in daily life. He counters the tradi-
tional aesthetic discourse paying attention to what happens in real life, 
“claiming that what we do is to bring words back from their metaphysi-
cal to their everyday use” (PI, § 48). He started by refl ecting on aes-
thetic phenomena; specifi cally, he was interested in situations where 
aesthetic disagreement arises about a given aesthetic matter. In a way, 
aesthetic enquiry evolves into a discussion concerning a disagreement 
over some artistic expression. The matter is localizing the source of 
what Wittgenstein called “aesthetic puzzlement”: when we encounter 
certain artworks, we experience disquiet or aesthetic discomfort and, 
at the very same time, we feel confused on the source of our experience 
(Johannessen 2004: 17).
According to Wittgenstein, the concept of aesthetics points to 
whether something is working or not, if it is pleasant or unpleasant, 
beautiful or ugly: in other words, aesthetics means to perceive that 
something has the right expression (or not), the right gesture (or not). 
Aesthetics is about understanding why something is right or wrong, 
and indeed about providing reasons for this. Only by understanding 
why something is right (or not) it is possible to change the way a per-
son perceives external things. Accordingly, research in aesthetics has 
fi rstly to deal with “aesthetic uncertainty”, indeed with situations in 
which the subject feels dissatisfi ed or disgusted by something, but he 
does not know why he has this kind of reaction.
From the discussion above, however, it will also be clear that aes-
thetics has also to deal with an ensemble of aesthetic reactions involv-
ing expressions and gestures aimed at the object that prompts the re-
action. As it was for language games, aesthetic reactions and aesthetic 
judgments display family resemblances: expressions like “beautiful” or 
“awful” are used in our linguistic practices as interjections, particularly 
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when we experience an artwork. In fact, as Wittgenstein points out, 
aesthetic reactions are of great signifi cance in addressing the concept 
of aesthetics (cf. LC, 2:10); and from aesthetic reactions, such as inter-
jections, will derive aesthetic language games (cf. LC, 1:5). Through 
aesthetic reactions, we can go back to the reason—as opposed to the 
cause—which motivates our aesthetic reactions. “According to the 
1933’s lessons (MWL, 9:30) a reason in aesthetics is a reason for hav-
ing this word in this place rather than that; this musical phrase rather 
than that. Reason = justifi cation.”
The aim is trying to resolve our aesthetic puzzlement by giving aes-
thetic explanations. Indeed, as Wittgenstein (MWL, 9:27) pointed out: 
“The question of Aesthetics is not: Do you like it? But, if you do, why 
do you?.”
The kinds of reasons we appeal to when we try to resolve our aes-
thetic perplexity are not causal explanations. Aesthetic impressions 
and reactions cannot be explained by external-causal matters: “There 
is a ‘Why?’ to aesthetic discomfort not a ‘cause’ to it” (LC, 2:19). Witt-
genstein rejected considering aesthetics a branch of psychology be-
cause it is not possible to explain aesthetic experience through causal 
explanations (Glock 1996: 33). “He fi rmly pointed out in his 1933’s les-
sons (MWL, 9:32) that the reasons have nothing to do with psychology.” 
Indeed, Wittgenstein’s aim is to formulate a grammatical explanation.
We can explain our aesthetic reactions through a better under-
standing of the work of art itself, which proceeds linguistically. Aes-
thetic explanation is descriptive; therefore, it is possible to distinguish 
between our aesthetic reactions and their reasons: “What reasons could 
I give for being satisfi ed? They are in the nature of further descrip-
tions” (MWL, 9:31).
Wittgenstein talked about rules also within the aesthetic frame. In 
fact, the use of language is thus the object of study of aesthetics. As 
we have seen, in his 1933 lectures (MWL, 4b), Wittgenstein already 
pointed out that beauty has no central relevance in aesthetics. In fact, 
it is rare to use terms such as “beautiful”, “magnifi cent”, “fi ne”, “ugly” 
in aesthetics. Words or expressions such as “beautiful” are not so im-
portant in our discussion of artworks: “beautiful” is only one type of 
word, that we can encounter at best sometimes. Later, during the 1938 
lessons, Wittgenstein reiterated his account, highlighting that only he 
who has a lack in aesthetic competence uses aesthetic adjectives such 
as “beautiful” or “magnifi cent”.
Indeed, our aesthetic competence is tied to aesthetic rules: “Witt-
genstein (LC, 1:11) asked in fact what rule are we using or referring to 
when we say: ‘This is the correct way’? If a music teacher says a piece 
should be played this way and plays it, what is he appealing to?.” This 
question is not as easy as one might think, and it requires an account 
of aesthetic rules in the fi rst place, and their correlation with aesthetic 
judgements (such as the teacher’s one).
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Familiarity with a set of aesthetic rules is a necessary condition 
for giving a competent aesthetic judgment according to the criteria of 
aesthetic correctness or aesthetic incorrectness (with respect to a given 
rule). It is also fundamental in aesthetic reasoning, and thus needed 
to make someone see what you see in art. Aesthetic judgment works 
in the same way; in fact, for Wittgenstein, what gives meaning to our 
aesthetic judgment are not merely the words contained in it, but the 
complex of cultural contexts and human activities in which we can ac-
tually fi nd the usage of these words (Shusterman 1986: 98).
The essential point is this: the more our knowledge of aesthetic 
rules is accurate, the more our aesthetic judgment will be appropriate. 
In fact, as Wittgenstein claimed, aesthetic rules are vital to aesthetic 
judgments: he clarifi ed that “if I hadn’t learnt the rules, I wouldn’t be 
able to make the aesthetic judgement. In learning the rules, you get a 
more and more refi ned judgement. Learning the rules actually changes 
your judgement” (LC, 1:15). This means that, although aesthetic judg-
ment is constrained by rules at any given time, it is also possible to 
acquire a “feeling for the rules” (Novitz 2004: 58), which opens the pos-
sibility to refi ne our aesthetic judgements over time. Moreover, aes-
thetic rules are embodied in our culture, which of course does change 
over time as well.
The meaning of an aesthetic judgment, and indeed of all the aes-
thetic activities that surround it, can be found within the socio-cultural 
context in which the judgement is used, and thus, ultimately, in its role 
in our “way of living”. In a way, our paradigms of aesthetic evaluation 
are as obscure or complicated as is their intertwining with our form of 
cultural life: they cannot be easily grasped by concepts. In fact, expres-
sions of aesthetic judgement show complicated roles within the culture 
of an historic period. According to Wittgenstein, the entire evaluative 
aesthetic paradigm is pluralistic: aesthetic judgments differ in differ-
ent historical contexts, they assume a diverse meaning. Wittgenstein 
supports an aesthetic paradigm characterized by historical pluralism 
or contextualism. Within this perspective aesthetic concepts,—i.e. 
beauty, ugliness, art, aesthetic appreciation, and so on—are made and 
shaped inside a culture and a period in human history: they change as 
societies change. Shusterman has in fact affi rmed that “our aesthetic 
concepts are inextricably bound up in our form of life, in ways of living 
which change over history through social, technical and even theoreti-
cal developments” (1986: 99). To understand and describe an aesthetic 
language game it seems necessary to acquire what Johannessen de-
fi nes as the “forms of behaviour relevant to art” (2004: 28). Adopting 
aesthetic practices is fundamental in order to develop aesthetic sensi-
tivity within the aesthetic fi eld.
Thereby, Wittgenstein’s description of the aesthetic fi eld might to 
lead us to a dead-end. Aesthetic judgements—and, consequently aes-
thetic rules, concepts, meanings and patterns of reasoning—cannot 
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always be clear to us. Indeed, if we accept that our aesthetic concepts 
have a plurality of uses, as well as variable, context-dependent con-
ditions of application, to determine an aesthetic concept would mean 
to describe the entire fi eld of our aesthetic judgments, which in turn 
would mean describing an entire culture. At best, this is extremely dif-
fi cult; at worse, it might be impossible to provide such detailed descrip-
tions of cultures. Practising aesthetic evaluation will be just as diffi cult 
as to succeed in clarifying the aesthetic concepts of someone who is not 
familiar with a given culture, and therefore with the set of aesthetic 
rules in force within it. In the same way, aesthetic reasoning is there-
fore limited by our language games “which constitute our aesthetic 
form of life” (Shusterman 1986: 105).
5. Fashion as an aesthetic form of life
Keeping in mind what we have said so far about the aesthetic para-
digms that can describe the evolution of fashion and considering the 
Wittgensteinian concepts we have addressed (PI, MWL and LC), it is 
now possible to delineate an aesthetic theory of fashion’s mechanism. 
Our thesis—namely that fashion works as a “form of life”—involves 
Matteucci’s claims on the possibility of comparing fashion to Woll-
heim’s aesthetic theory. In this sense, fashion can be a “form of life” 
within a Wittgensteinian perspective. In order to demonstrate this the-
sis, we must apply the concept of “form of life” to fashion and see if and 
how this theory works.
First of all, we can note that dressing ourselves involves a set of 
actions that are (or are not) in agreement with aesthetic rules. That 
said, these rules are not normative impositions which impose us a way 
to dress. As Wittgenstein saw, the understanding of rules can never be 
exhausted by the process of rule-formulation; similarly, rules in fash-
ion are not verbal or written fi xed expressions of an impositio and the 
teaching of rules is not a mere explanation of the rule itself. The rules 
in aesthetics have blurred boundaries.9 They are not eternal, since they 
are tied to the context in which they are to be followed as well as to 
the historical period in which they develop. Indeed, the aesthetic rules 
that govern the activity of dressing follow a temporal cyclic evolution 
immanent to fashion itself. Moreover, as Appelqvist affi rms “the rules 
can be changed and abandoned as we go along” (2019: 988): the nature 
of grammatical rules is arbitrary (cf. MWL 7:2).
This is also the reason why it is rather hard to set an example of 
aesthetic rule in fashion once and for all. For aesthetic rules do not 
exist as platonic entities that determine how to dress properly for a 
specifi c occasion; rather, they are formed by abstraction from our daily 
9 Along with the concept of language game, in which the rules are employed in 
order to play (Cf. PI §71) and the correlated meaning.
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practice10. Thus, in following a rule, one does follow an aesthetic ideal: 
aesthetic rules in fashion lie “in a certain consistency of our reactions 
and preferences, and [they] change over time (Schroeder 2020: 13). In 
this sense, dressing everyday according to aesthetic rules recalls Witt-
genstein’s concept of “following a rule”: the act of dressing is a practice, 
indeed an action that we perform regularly, i.e. in accordance to certain 
rules or norms.
 The notion of ‘rule’ is tied with what Wittgenstein called “language 
game.”11 Applying Wittgenstein’s view to fashion results in the realiza-
tion that, in dressing up for different occasions and contexts, we play 
different aesthetic language games with different aesthetic rules.12 The 
analogy with games lets us see that, as the rules of a game change 
depending on the game we play, aesthetic rules might vary from one 
aesthetic context to another too (cf. MWL 8:87). Consequently, the 
meaning of a certain dress can change depending upon the context and 
the aesthetic rules that govern it. In fact, the meaning of clothes is de-
pendent on the “use” we make of them in different ordinary contexts. 
Just as the meaning of a word can change according to its use and the 
context of its employment of, in the same way a garment worn in a cer-
tain way or in a certain place and time can acquire different meanings. 
Thus, the meaning and the sense of a dress are, to a certain extent, 
fl uid.
The assemblage of rules—by which we can play different language 
games—and the correlated meanings form what Wittgenstein called 
“grammar”. In my proposed analogy, this means that in the ordinary 
language of dressing we appeal to what I have labeled “the grammar of 
dressing”. Similarly to Wittgenstein’s linguistic perspective, it is pos-
sible to grasp intuitively the grammar of dressing through “a synoptic 
view of the grammatical system as a whole” (Appelqvist 2019: 989).13 
This way of looking at grammar does not allow to fi nd a “conceptually 
determinable foundation for those norms” (Appelqvist 2019: 989): it is 
an expression of a ‘intuitive’ method to grasp meanings. Nonetheless, 
this does not imply that aesthetic rules cannot be defi ned as normative 
rules, as long as we consider them as part of a grammatical framework 
which is not eternal. Indeed, the aesthetic rules “are constitutive of 
the system themselves, given in the actual practices of language use” 
(Appelqvist 2017: 138): they are funded in the ordinary context of our 
routine by the repetitive action that we make when we get dressed.
To those who do not know their meaning, the rules of fashion are 
explained in the same way the meaning of a certain word or proposition 
10 When I say “This isn’t the colour I mean; it’s too cold”, I don’t hallucinate the 
colour I mean to fi nd what ideal we’re directed to, you must look at what we do: the 
ideal is the tendency of people who create such a thing (MWL, 9:22).
11 Cf. section 2.
12 One language game in fashion can be defi ned as “dressing to go to work” or 
“dressing to go to a wedding” and so on.
13 “Taking something in as a whole at a glance” (MWL 8:59).
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can be explained to someone who does not speak a certain language. In 
fact, precise training is required to dress properly. Partly, this training 
is also linguistic, for if someone is not able to understand the meaning 
of some clothes, then we can teach them to use fashion-related words 
through examples and by practice.14 However, at the ultimate level, 
fashion requires a precise training in which what matters the most are 
the infl uences given by “expressions of agreement, rejection, expecta-
tion, encouragement” (cf. PI, § 208).
With exercise and training one can access the “grammar of dress-
ing” (i.e. the set of rules on how to dress) thanks to which it is possible 
to learn, on the one hand, to apply the rules in the right context, and 
on the other hand to acquire a competent judgment on fashion-related 
matters.15 This way, we can become sensitive to the rules that govern 
the phenomenon of fashion. And the more we become sensitive to these 
rules, the more we will be likely to become experts in the fi eld of fash-
ion. By becoming familiar with the “grammar of dressing” it is also 
possible to create interpretative spaces of fashion, which contribute to 
creating new rules of and for fashion. The fashion expert, he or she who 
understands fashion, is the yardstick with which to compare oneself 
when one is trained in fashion.
Fashion is also a source of aesthetic reactions: a shorter or longer 
dress can cause in us an uncomfortable reaction that can be expressed 
in a sign of disapproval (verbal, gestural or facial expression), as well 
as reactions of appreciation.16 The frequent use of the garment de-
notes the pleasure one feels towards the dress, vice versa, not wear-
ing a dress denotes dissatisfaction. In this sense, the use of a garment 
can express both the meaning of a dress in a certain context and the 
pleasure and tastes we have in aesthetic terms for certain garments. 
Furthermore, we can express in fashion aesthetic judgments based on 
aesthetic criteria of correctness. In fact, when we make an aesthetic 
judgment in fashion, we refer to a set of more or less evident rules, 
indicating the correctness (or not) of certain items of clothing or acces-
sories.17 But how do we know when a fashion’s match is aesthetically 
14 Expressions such as “I love your skirt” or “This jacket suits you better than that 
one” or “This colour doesn’t suit you” might be a reference to the linguistic training. 
Moreover, approval or disapproval, like or dislike, uncertainty and indecision can 
be expressed also through gestures: smiling, raising the eyebrows, rolling eyes and 
so on.
15 Sensibility to the grammar of dressing is shown in our ability to discern which 
garment is best for each occasion (such as a white shirt for a job interview or a 
long dress for a wedding). Once one will acquire sensibility to the rules and context, 
one will be more competent in giving fashion judgments, which are expressed with 
advices and suggestions.
16 A clear example is given in LC 1:13.
17 One can express an aesthetic judgment towards a garment in every context. 
For example, if I’m wearing a suit or a tailleur for my fi rst day at work in a formal 
environment, I can receive aesthetic judgments expressing correctness for my choice. 
Otherwise, if I’m wearing a cyan suit with amber shoes, I can receive aesthetic 
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correct or wrong? Here, close to the aesthetic concept of correctness, we 
encounter another central Wittgensteinian notion, namely the notion 
of the “clicking”.
A “click” might be confi gured as a perception of correctness, which, 
applied to fashion, allows its functioning and diffusion. In fact, since 
the rules of fashion are conceptually diffi cult to grasp, the parameter of 
fashion-related judgments would also be diffi cult to understand if the 
“clicking” did not come into play. The “click” is an indication of correct-
ness and, therefore, it is nothing more than a last proof of the correct 
to follow a certain rule. And it is thanks to this correctness index that 
we can better identify the rules that fashion dictates from time to time 
(cf. LC 2:8).
There are indeed some problems with this aesthetic paradigm of 
fashion. The fi rst one is that the set of rules to which we appeal daily 
in dressing and within which aesthetic judgments are developed are 
almost never explicit and clear. It is very diffi cult (if not practically 
impossible) to draw up an exhaustive list of rules according to which 
to dress in everyday life and which are able to provide us with a stable 
criterion of aesthetic judgment. This diffi culty emerges both at a broad 
level, namely the level of the basic rules of everyday dressing, and at a 
more specifi c level, dealing with the seasonality of fashion.
Since understanding and describing the rules that govern fashion is 
almost as diffi cult as defi ning the use of expressions of aesthetic judg-
ment. To have a chance to succeed in understanding aesthetic judge-
ments, you need to be familiar with the kind of aesthetic rules that gov-
ern fashion. However, to be familiar with these types of rules does not 
amount necessarily to be experts in the fi eld of fashion, e.g. a stylist. 
It just means we can express aesthetic judgments concerning fashion, 
which, like the rules of fashion itself, are intimately connected with the 
culture of a certain historical period.
The solution to this problem could be to look at our analogy with 
language games: dressing up in fashion, or dressing for a specifi c occa-
sion (a wedding, a theme party, etc.) are nothing more than different 
language games. And only by playing one game rather than another 
is it possible to understand the rules that guide it: in the same way it 
is therefore possible to understand the rules and aesthetic reactions 
that guide fashion. In fact, the correctness of a certain dress for a given 
context only emerges when two people play the same language game 
and can therefore assess what is right or wrong in clothing. By shar-
ing the same language game of fashion, it is possible to grasp the rules 
that determine it. In this sense, we can defi ne fashion as a particular 
“form of life”.
judgements expressing the incorrectness of my dressing choice. In the latter case, 
the colour combination of cyan and amber can be followed by discomfort or disgust 
by the observers.
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6. Conclusions
To conclude, considering what we have discussed so far, we can say 
that the combination of Wittgenstein’s aesthetic-linguistic paradigm 
with fashion works: in fact, the meaning of a dress can change depend-
ing on the context; the rules that fashion follows are not eternal, and 
therefore reconcile with the properties of cyclicality and the ephemeral 
being of fashion. Thus, the meaning of a dress will also change as the 
rules concerning how to dress change. This set of rules constitutes a 
grammar proper to fashion, or a “grammar of dressing.” Further, the 
practice of following a rule is consolidated thanks to a mimetic train-
ing trough which it is possible to acquire sensitivity to the rules, and 
thereby to becoming experts with respect to the rule. Since these rules 
are not eternal, it is possible to modify some of them, giving space to 
the need for differentiation and expression of one’s identity, while at 
the same time not disregarding criteria of correctness or incorrectness 
of the way of dressing.
We can therefore say that fashion is a constellation of aesthetic lan-
guage games—interpreted as sets of linguistic and cultural practices 
that constantly intertwine—or indeed an aesthetic language with a 
grammar of its own. Indeed, a form of life organizes the set of human 
practices in cultural and historical communities, and fashion could be 
one of these historical and cultural practices, which however structures 
or organizes itself according to its own, time-bound rules. Consider 
again Simmel’s concept of fashion: the trickle-down theory was a model 
of nineteenth-century fashion that, however, can no longer be said to 
be valid in our times. The society of the time displayed a hierarchi-
cal structure that defi ned the value of fashion in a different way than 
today. As a result, fashion was closely linked to social and economic 
values of the time: it was a symbol of unequivocal social status. The 
relationships between social classes were rigidly vertical with respect 
to our society, in which, instead, there are opposite horizontal forces 
that guide the economic criteria of diffusion of fashion. The theoretical 
model of fashion outlined by Simmel was related to the Lebensform in 
which he himself lived. Simmel had, on the one hand, the great merit 
of discovering one of the key principles of the mechanism of fashion, 
namely the imitation-differentiation dialectic. On the other hand, its 
theoretical model cannot perfectly describe the trend of fashion today 
as we do not share the same form of life.
As a last test of the juxtaposition of the concepts of language game 
and fashionable life-form, a brief thought experiment might be helpful. 
Imagine being taken, without warning from the year 2019 to the year 
1860, during the Victorian era on a busy street in London at the time. 
The fi rst thing that passers-by intuitively would notice is how you are 
dressed: the substantial differences between the garments of the time 
(with lace, large skirts and showy hats with feathers) and today’s way 
of dressing. Likely, even gestures and movements will be completely 
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different between you and nineteenth-century Londoners. In addition 
to this, even good taste will have completely different standards and 
criteria: therefore, the aesthetic judgment of nineteenth-century Lon-
doners towards your way of dressing will, most probably, be based on 
the observation that your clothes are not the correct ones.
A form of life, in fact, can create shared horizons in which mutual 
understanding is possible and in which a sense of belonging to a socio-
cultural community is formed. Fashion as a form of life, in the same 
way, draws horizons of taste shared by the community in which to 
recognize oneself aesthetically. Thus, fashion as an aesthetic practice 
gives life to various forms of practices concerning good taste, outlining 
the rules that contribute to the ‘grammar of dressing’ of one’s time: it 
forms a common aesthetic sense in which to move in the daily context 
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